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Abstract. On 30th October 2008, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit held en 
banc that a computer related invention is patentable if “(1) it is tied to a particular machine or 
apparatus, or (2) it transforms a particular article into a different state or thing”. The ‘useful, 
concrete and tangible result’ test laid down by the same Court in State Street2 was effectively 
overruled. On June 1st 2009, the Supreme Court of the United States of America has granted a 
petition for a writ of certiorari against the decision in Bilski. Bilski is regressive in many senses, but 
is also consistent with precedent. The aim of this paper is to study the evolution of the law in 
relation to software patents over the years in the USA and compare this with the present Indian 
position. This paper aims to outline the position of law in the United States as it stands now. It also 
advances arguments as to what the United States Supreme Court should hold in the Bilski case, now 
that it has granted an order of certiorari. It then looks at the position of Indian law before concluding 
on how the Courts can interpret the present law and whether any change in the law is needed to that 
effect. In India, the statute excludes from patentable subject matter – “computer programs per se or 
algorithms”. There is no Indian case law in relation to the interpretation of this clause. Clearly, how 
this is interpreted would make a considerable difference to the patentability of software in the Indian 
scenario. The paper is limited in scope to legal arguments and does not look at policy questions, as 
to whether software should be granted patent protection or not.  
 
1. History of Patentability of Software in the USA 
 
The issue that arises here is the interpretation of the word ‘process’ that appears in the United States Code in 
context of patents. 35 U.S.C. § 101 reads “Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, 
manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefore, 
subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.” 5 U.S.C. § 100(b) defines ‘process’ as meaning “process, 
art or method, and includes a new use of a known process, machine, manufacture, composition of matter, or 
material.” This definition is most unhelpful, especially given that in defining process, it uses the word process. In 
this Section, the journey of software as patentable subject matter is seen with respect to the Supreme Court of the 
United States [“SCOTUS”], The Court of Customs and Patent Appeals [“CCPA”] and the Court of Appeals for the 
Federal Circuit [“CAFC”] that was created by Congress in 1982 primarily to hear patent cases. 
1.1 Doctrines prior to Benson  
1.1.1. Mental Steps and Functions of Machine Doctrines 
 
Prior to the various SCOTUS decisions on the topic, the CCPA had taken the stand that processes involving 
mental operations were considered unpatentable. This was applied for any mathematical algorithm as well as any 
invention where the primary inventive component was a mathematical algorithm. This meant that no software 
process could possibly be patented.3 The ‘function of a machine’ doctrine is generally traced to a 19th Century 
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judgment of the Supreme Court of the United States.4 The Court stated in that case - “it is well settled that a man 
cannot have a patent for the function or abstract effect of a machine, but only for the machine which produces it.”5 
By two judgements in 1968,6 In Re Tarczy-Hornoch and In Re Prater, the CCPA did away with the above two 
doctrines stating that they were a misinterpretation of precedent. 
1.1.2. Technological Arts Doctrine  
 
In 1970,7 the CCPA stated that any sequence of operational steps was a patentable process so long as it was within 
‘technological arts’ so as to be in consonance with the Constitutional mandate to promote the progress of useful 
arts. Article I, Section 8 states “The United States Congress shall have Power…To promote the Progress of 
Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their 
respective Writings and Discoveries.” 
The case dealt with the patentability of a method of improving the delineation of geological subsurface 
formations by taking a series of seismograms from geographically separated stations by using a hyperbolic 
function to the family of seismograms produced by a particular arrangement of stations. The claim was rejected as 
the novelty lay in the mental process as opposed to the physical steps. The CCPA however, reversed and rejected 
the point of novelty approach followed by the patent office. On the point of novelty approach, if the novelty or 
advancement in the art claimed by the inventor resided solely in a step of the process embodying a mental 
operation or other unpatentable element, the claim was rejected under § 101 as being directed to nonstatutory 
subject matter. The Court relied on Prater to hold that the mental steps doctrine had been done away with and 
hence, the ‘point of novelty’ approach also lost its footing. 
The ‘technological arts’ standard was refined in Re Benson,8 in which the court held that computers, 
regardless of the uses to which they are put, are within the technological arts for purposes of §101.  
1.2. Gottschalk v. Benson9 
 
This case related to the patentability of an algorithm to convert binary-coded decimal numbers [“BCD”] into 
purely binary numbers. The Court relied on Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Co.,10 where it was held that newly 
discovered phenomena of nature could not be patented and extended the logic from a product patent to a process 
patent and included mental processes or abstract intellectual concepts as not patentable, simply because “they are 
the basic tools of scientific and technological work”. Keeping this in mind, the Court took the stand that the 
conversion of BCD was too abstract to be patentable as it covered both known and unknown uses of the algorithm. 
In the reversal of the CCPA judgment, the Court did not refer to the new ‘technological arts’ doctrine or to the 
rejection of the ‘mental steps’ and ‘functions of a machine’ doctrines.  
This decision has often been interpreted as a prohibition of all software patents across the board. This is 
perhaps supported by the statistics that show that in the decade that followed this judgement, virtually no one 
applied for a software patent.11 While the judgement may have given that impression on first reading, all that the 
judgment states is that the phenomena of nature cannot be patented. The following observation perhaps led to this 
conclusion – “The mathematical formula involved here has no substantial practical application except in 
connection with a digital computer, which means that if the judgment below is affirmed, the patent would wholly 
pre-empt the mathematical formula and in practical effect would be a patent on the algorithm itself.” The judgment 
also stated in conclusion that “[i]t may be that the patent laws should be extended to cover these programs, a 
policy matter to which we are not competent to speak. The President's Commission on the Patent System rejected 
the proposal that these programs be patentable.” As explained in the judgment itself, the Commission report 
advocated the rejection of software patents as it believed that the patent office lacked a reliable classification as 
well as a searching technique and hence could not examine applications.  
The number systems and conversion techniques have certain innate characteristics and properties that 
cannot be changed, but merely discovered. No patent is possible on such abstract concepts. If limited to the facts 
of the case, this is the possible understanding of the judgement. The judgement stated that “It is said that the 
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decision precludes a patent for any program servicing a computer. We do not so hold.” However, if one was to 
look merely at the words of the opinion, it seems that the Supreme Court was indeed saying later that patents could 
not be obtained for computer programmes. “If these programs are to be patentable, considerable problems are 
raised which only committees of Congress can manage, for broad powers of investigation are needed, including 
hearings which canvass the wide variety of views which those operating in this field entertain. The technological 
problems tendered in the many briefs before us indicate to us that considered action by the Congress is needed.” 
It is interesting to note that after looking through all the precedent on process patents, the Supreme Court 
rejected the argument that a process patent must either be “tied to a particular machine or apparatus or must 
operate to change articles or materials to a ‘different state or thing.’” The Court opined that they were not limiting 
the process patent only to these two conditions.  
1.3. INTERPRETATION OF BENSON 
1.3.1. Point of Novelty Approach 
 
The CCPA resurrected this approach post Benson and held that a process claim in which the only novel part was a 
mathematical equation to be solved as the final step of the process was not patentable.12 This approach was, 
however, short lived and the CCPA sought to narrow the interpretation of Benson with each new case that came 
before it. 
1.3.2. Apparatus/Process Distinction 
 
In 1974, the CCPA held that Benson applied only to process claims and not to apparatus claims. The case related 
to a recordkeeping system that involved a digital computer with a programme.13 In dissent, Judge Rich stated that 
limiting Benson to process claims would make the question of patentability turn on the form or means in which the 
program invention was claimed as opposed to the substance of the claim. In 1976, again, the CCPA upheld the 
earlier judgment and based its decision on the reasoning that a computer with a programme is structurally different 
from the same computer. Judge Rich found himself in dissent again, this time joined by Judge Lane, who both felt 
that Benson had barred the patent of computer programmes across the board. The case related to an apparatus for 
scanning and converting data signals. Benson was distinguished by stating that this case related to a specific 
purpose and operated in relation to a particular technology as opposed to a ‘phenomena of nature’.14  
1.4. Parker v. Flook15 
 
Six years after Benson, a question arose as to whether the “identification of a limited category of useful, though 
conventional, post-solution applications of such a formula” makes patentable a mathematical formula not 
otherwise patentable (as under Benson). The patent related to an algorithm that updated ‘alarm limits’. As 
explained in the opinion of the Court, “[d]uring catalytic conversion processes, operating conditions such as 
temperature, pressure, and flow rates are constantly monitored. When any of these ‘process variables’ exceeds a 
predetermined ‘alarm limit’, an alarm may signal the presence of an abnormal condition indicating either 
inefficiency or perhaps danger. Fixed alarm limits may be appropriate for a steady operation, but during transient 
operating situations, such as start-up, it may be necessary to ‘update’ the alarm limits periodically.”  
The patent officer had rejected the application on the grounds that the difference between prior art and the 
invention was merely an algorithm and a patent would in practice be on the formula, and this was not patentable as 
under Benson. The CCPA reversed and held that since the mere solution of the algorithm would not be an 
infringement, a patent on the method would not pre-empt the formula. The acting Commissioner of Patents and 
trademarks filed the petition for the writ of certiorari as he felt that the number of patent applications would 
increase exponentially given the rapidly expanding software industry.  
The Court held that the words in Benson relating to pre-empting the entire mathematical formula would not 
apply here, as there are numerous uses of this formula outside the petrochemical industry that would remain in the 
public domain. The Court reasoned that an assumption ought to be made that the principle or mathematical 
formula were well known, and the invention was merely a new mode of applying it. The Court derived this 
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reasoning from O’Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. 62, which in turn had applied the reasoning of an English Judgement of 
the Court of the Exchequer, Neilson v. Harford, (1841) 151 ER 1266. The latter case dealt with a patent 
application for a discovery that a blast furnace was more efficient if the air was heated before being blown through 
the molten iron. His ‘invention’ related to passing the air through a heating chamber. The Court granted patent and 
drew a distinction between a principle and the application of a principle. In the words of Baron Parke, “We think 
the case must be considered as if, the principle being well known, the plaintiff had first invented a mode of 
applying it by a mechanical apparatus to furnaces; and his invention then consists in this — by interposing a 
receptacle for heated air between the blowing apparatus and the furnace.”  
Based on this reasoning, since the output of the formula was merely a number, the Court opined that this 
was akin to seeking a patent for ‘discovering’ that the formula for the calculation of a circumference of a circle can 
be used for calculation of circumference of a wheel. The Court as in Benson held that this decision did not lay 
down a blanket ban on software patents, but just that when stressing the distinction between a principle and its 
application, and considering that the principle was prior art, there was no new use discovered and that the 
discovery of phenomenon cannot be patented unless there is some other inventive concept in its application.  
The Court held that”the youth of the industry may explain the complete absence of precedent supporting 
patentability. Neither the dearth of precedent, nor this decision, should therefore be interpreted as reflecting a 
judgment that patent protection of certain novel and useful computer programs will not promote the progress of 
science and the useful arts, or that such protection is undesirable as a matter of policy. Difficult questions of policy 
concerning the kinds of programs that may be appropriate for patent protection and the form and duration of such 
protection can be answered by Congress on the basis of current empirical data not equally available to this 
tribunal.” 
1.5. POST FLOOK PATENTABILITY OF SOFTWARE  
1.5.1. Freeman-Walter-Abele Test 
 
The test arose from three judgements of the CCPA.16 The test had two parts. First, to determine whether the claim 
recites an algorithm within the meaning of Benson and second, determining whether the algorithm is “applied in 
any manner to physical elements or process steps”.17 The test was rejected in Re Alappat and this rejection has 
been held inadequate in Bilski.18 
1.5.2. Rejection of Flook 
 
The CCPA critiqued Flook and stated that Flook essentially jumbled statutory provisions that were conceptually 
unrelated.19 The CCPA moved on to distinguish Flook on facts and ruled that Flook turned on the way the patent 
claim was drafted. The CCPA took the position that if a claim disclosed an entire process as novel, it would be 
patentable, even if the only novel element were a computer program. In Re Diehr20 construed Flook in this 
manner.  
1.6. Diamond v. Diehr21   
 
Decided in 1981, the case related to the patentability of a process for moulding raw, uncured synthetic rubber into 
cured precision products that includes in several of its steps the use of a mathematical formula and a programmed 
digital computer. The Court held by bare majority of 5 to 4, that “continuous measuring of the temperature inside 
the mould cavity, the feeding of this information to a digital computer which constantly recalculates the cure time, 
and the signalling by the computer to open the press are all new in the art” and could hence be patented.  
The Court reasoned that what was sought to be patented here was not an algorithm or formula, but a 
process for curing of rubber. While this process involved the use of a mathematical equation, they did not seek to 
pre-empt the use of that equation. What this patent does in effect is only to foreclose the use of that particular 
equation in conjunction with the other steps in the process. It was here that the Court laid down the machine or 
transformation test. In the words of Chief Justice Rehnquist, “On the other hand, when a claim containing a 
mathematical formula implements or applies that formula in a structure or process which, when considered as a 
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whole, is performing a function which the patent laws were designed to protect (e.g., transforming or reducing an 
article to a different state or thing), then the claim satisfies the requirements of §101.”  
This test has ostensibly been applied by Bilski and states that software can be patented if connected to a machine 
or if part of a process that brings about transformation.  
Justice Stevens in dissent opined that the majority had misunderstood the patent application and in effect 
had ‘trivialised’ the holding in Flook and the principle that underlies Benson along with a settled line of precedent 
that had interpreted these judgments. However, he concedes that if the reading of the patent by the Majority were 
correct, then it would be patentable. He states that curing of rubber is a patentable process as is clear from the 
grant of patent to Charles Goodyear many years prior. He continues that what is sought to be patented here is very 
similar to what was sought to be patented in Flook. He states, “The essence of the claimed discovery in both cases 
was an algorithm that could be programmed on a digital computer. In Flook, the algorithm made use of multiple 
process variables; in this case, it makes use of only one. In Flook, the algorithm was expressed in a newly 
developed mathematical formula; in this case, the algorithm makes use of a well known mathematical formula. 
Manifestly, neither of these differences can explain today's holding.”  
He finally advocated a complete ban on the patentability of computer related inventions (software). He saw 
two problems with the Majority’s ruling. “First, the cases considering the patentability of program-related 
inventions do not establish rules that enable a conscientious patent lawyer to determine with a fair degree of 
accuracy which, if any, program-related inventions will be patentable. Second, the inclusion of the ambiguous 
concept of an "algorithm" within the "law of nature" category of unpatentable subject matter has given rise to the 
concern that almost any process might be so described, and therefore held unpatentable… I believe both concerns 
would be better addressed by (1) an unequivocal holding that no program-related invention is a patentable process 
under § 101 unless it makes a contribution to the art that is not dependent entirely on the utilization of a computer, 
and (2) an unequivocal explanation that the term ‘algorithm’ as used in this case, as in Benson and Flook, is 
synonymous with the term ‘computer program’.” However, he found himself in the dissent and SCOTUS had 
finally allowed the grant of a software patent and ostensibly overruled Flook.  
1.7. Post Diehr Cases on patentability of software 
1.7.1. In Re Alappat22 
 
The CAFC sat en banc in 1994 to decide on the patentability of a means of creating “a smooth waveform display 
in a digital oscilloscope”. The effect of the ruling was clear wherein it allowed the patent of any software even if it 
ran on a general-purpose computer. The result of this was that a data structure, that is a way of arranging data, was 
granted patent protection. The Court held that the “printed matter exception” applied only to printed lines of 
characters “intelligible only to the human mind”. Based on this, software (data structure) in the instant case is 
processed by a machine and hence would never come under the exception.23 Any computer programme per se was 
therefore patentable so long as it was more than a mere mathematical equation. Relying on an earlier SCOTUS 
ruling that Congress intended the patentability of “anything under the Sun that is made by man”,24 the Court 
narrowed the application of the trilogy of SCOTUS cases and stated that under the three cases, it was clear that the 
only three judicially created exclusions were “laws of nature, natural phenomena and abstract protection”. The 
Court stated, “A close analysis of Diehr, Flook, and Benson reveals that the Supreme Court never intended to 
create an overly broad, fourth category of subject matter excluded from Section 101. Rather, at the core of the 
Court’s analysis in each of these cases lies an attempt by the Court to explain a rather straightforward concept, 
namely, that certain types of mathematical subject matter, standing alone, represent nothing more than abstract 
ideas until reduced to some type of practical application, and thus that subject matter is not, in and of itself, 
entitled to patent protection.” The Court then relied on pre Flook judgements25 to hold that a computer program 
structurally altered a computer and thus, a general-purpose computer with a computer program would become a 
special-purpose computer.  
1.7.2. State Street Bank and Trust v. Signature Financial Group Inc.26 
 
In 1998, the CAFC laid down the ‘useful, concrete and tangible result test’. The case related to a claim entitled 
“Data Processing System for Hub and Spoke Financial Services Configuration.” It was a data processing system 
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facilitating the spokes (mutual funds) to pool their assets in a hub (investment portfolio) in the form of a 
partnership. The case relied on the earlier decision in Alappat and stated that to be patentable, an algorithm must 
be applied in a ‘useful’ way. The Court rejected the Freeman-Walter-Abele test and stated that after Diehr and 
Chakrabarty, the test has no application. “[W]e hold that the transformation of data, representing discrete dollar 
amounts, by a machine through a series of mathematical calculations into a final share price, constitutes a practical 
application of a mathematical algorithm, formula, or calculation, because it produces ‘a useful, concrete and 
tangible result’--a final share price momentarily fixed for recording and reporting purposes and even accepted and 
relied upon by regulatory authorities and in subsequent trades.”  
The case also held that business methods were not excluded from patent protection as under the law. The 
Court held that the only exceptions have been found in Title 35 or the judge-made exceptions of abstract idea, laws 
of nature or phenomena of nature. In A.T. & T. Corporation v. Excel Communications Inc., 172 F.3d 1352, the 
CAFC found that a method involving electronic switches and a telecommunication system was eligible to be 
patented. The Court stated “any step-by-step process, be it electronic, chemical, or mechanical, involves an 
'algorithm' in the broad sense of the term.”  
1.7.3. In Re Bilsky27 
 
In the recent en banc judgement by the CAFC, the Court rejected both the tests laid down in State Street as well as 
the Freeman-Walter-Abele test. The case related to a claim of hedging commodity transactions. The Court denied 
Bilski a patent and set down a single test for the patentability of software or business methods (or of processes in 
general). In the words of the Court, “purported transformations or manipulations simply of public or private legal 
obligations or relationships, business risks, or other such abstractions cannot meet the test because they are not 
physical objects or substances, and they are not representative of physical objects or substances.”  
The Court held that a process would be patentable if it is tied to a particular machine or apparatus or if it 
transforms a particular article into a different state. The question as to whether a general-purpose computer would 
come under the first test was left open for future decision. In Relation to the second test, the Court qualified it by 
stating “the involvement of the machine or transformation in the claimed process must not merely be insignificant 
extra-solution activity.”  
A recent judgement (November 24th, 2008) of the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences [“BPAI”], Ex 
Parte Halligan, B.P.A.I. Appeal 2008-1588 dealt with this issue at length. The BPAI noted that the Federal Circuit 
provided “some guidance [to deal with this problem] when it explained that the use of a specific machine must 
impose meaningful limits on the claim's scope to impart patent-eligibility.” The claims dealt with “a method [to 
account for trade secrets] performed on a programmed computer.” The claims' scope was not limited as it added 
“nothing more than a general purpose computer that has been programmed in an unspecified manner to implement 
the functional steps recited in the claims.”28 
In Judge Newman’s dissent, she felt that inventions that deal with particular processes like data handling or 
photonic technology would be granted protection and would therefore be a disincentive in these emerging fields of 
technology.29 Judge Rader, in his dissent stated, “today’s software transforms our lives without physical anchors” 
and that this test effectively “not only risks hobbling these advances, but precluding patent protection for 
tomorrow's technologies.” Another problem with Bilski is that it rigidly applies the test it has laid down and makes 
it necessary as opposed to a sufficient condition.30 However, the case itself seems to have made it easy to 
distinguish in future by stating that “we certainly do not rule out the possibility that this court may in the future 
refine or augment the test or how it is applied.” It seems that Bilski, though a reasoned judgement lacks the 
foresight required in interpreting the law, especially when it comes to technology.31 It is, however, not likely to be 
overruled in SCOTUS. The next Section discusses how SCOTUS should see Bilski and how it should rule on this 
issue. 
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 2. Bilsky and Scotus  
 
Upon reading the case carefully, and understanding the limits placed by the Court in Bilski, it seems that Bilski is 
in perfect consonance with the thinking that prevailed in SCOTUS during the 1970s as opposed to the broader 
interpretation given by the CAFC in preceding years.32 As far as this goes, it seems to be in consonance with 
Stevens’ dissent in Diehr. 
Bilski is an opportunity for SCOTUS to look at the State Street test. In the ten years that State Street held 
the field and the four years before that under Alappat, SCOTUS declined to interfere with the foresight of the 
CCPA. The CCPA made it easier to get software patents, in light of rapidly advancing technology.  
It is therefore felt that SCOTUS should overrule Bilski. If there is to be a proscription on software patents, 
it must be from Congress and cannot be by judicial mandate. The State Street test seems to be the right test for 
software patents and should be upheld by SCOTUS.  
Another issue as seen from the CCPA’s interpretations of Benson related to distinguishing the case by 
making an apparatus/process distinction. The problem with this is that a clever patent attorney need only draft his 
software patent as an apparatus claim thereby circumventing the tests under § 101.33 SCOTUS will have to 
expressly state that its holding would apply to pseudo process claims that are in the guise of an apparatus claim. 
However, the question then arises as to where the line ought to be drawn between a pseudo process claim and an 
actual apparatus claim. SCOTUS should lay down guidelines dealing with exactly how a patent examiner should 
determine this, by looking at the substance of the claim as opposed to its form.   
3. Indian Position on Patentability of Software34 
 
Section 3(k) of The Patents Act, 1970 states that “a mathematical or business method or a computer program per 
se or algorithms” are not inventions within the meaning of the Act and hence, not patentable. There is considerable 
debate on the interpretation of per se as well as that of computer program. The question that arises is whether 
computer program refers to any software, or only to a programming language or platform on which software can 
be designed. If it represents the former, then there seems to be a proscription on patents for software, while if it 
means the latter, the bar is merely on a type of software, on which it is possible to build other software, in order to 
ensure that innovation is not stifled by the grant of patent. The Patents (Second Amendment) Bill, 1999 did not 
contain the words per se. This was added on the recommendation of the Joint Committee set up by Parliament. 
“With respect to the patenting of software inventions, the Joint Committee recommended the insertion of the 
phrase “per se” in Section 3(k) of the bill and clarified that the phrase was being inserted to address the 
patentability of inventions relating to computer programs that may include certain other things ‘ancillary thereto’ 
or ‘developed thereon’. The Joint Committee further clarified that the intention of the bill was not to reject such 
inventions from grant of patents but only to distinguish such inventions from the underlying computer programs as 
such.”35 This distinction seems oddly artificial and would be an impossible line to draw. All software is capable of 
improvement and any patent would stifle innovation in relation to that particular software. The general impression 
is that the only way to get software patented would be by amendment to the existing law.36  
An interesting twist, however, is the draft patent manual.37 This document has no statutory backing, but 
regulates the procedure a patent examiner has to follow. As per this manual, software is made patentable if it has 
technical application. The manual divides patent claims in relation to computer inventions into three categories. 
Method/Process, Apparatus/System and Computer program product. In Relation to the first category, the manual 
states that in order to distinguish it from software per se, a claim for software directed towards a technical process 
would be patentable and distinct from mere software. The manual states –  
                                                          
32
 See M.J. Edwards and D. Steinberg, “The Implications of Bilski: Patentable Subject Matter in the United States”, 49 IDEA 411 
(2009).  
33
 See O. Armon and E. Gardner, “New Restrictions on the Patentability of Process Claims: Looking Beyond In Re Bilsky”, Journal of 
Internet Law (2009).  
34
 Indian cases normally make copius references to judgements from the US and the UK. For instance, all the judgements on the right 
to privacy are based almost entirely on cases from SCOTUS. See Gobind v. State of M.P., 1975 CriLJ 1111. Although SCOTUS 
judgements are not binding on Indian Courts, they have considerable persuasive value.  
35
 See Essenese Obhan, “Patenting of Software Inventions in India”, Spicy IP India, available at: 
http://spicyipindia.blogspot.com/2009/02/guest-post-on-software-patenting-in.html (last visited on 3rd August, 2009).  
36
 See Shamnahad Basheer, “A method to the madness”, The Mint, available at: http://www.livemint.com/2008/11/05233957/A-
method-to-the-madness.html?h=B (last visited on 3rd August, 2009).  
37
 See Draft Manual of Patent Practice and Procedure, pp. 72 to 74, available at: 
http://ipindia.nic.in/ipr/patent/DraftPatent_Manual_2008.pdf (last seen on 4th August, 2009).  
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“Technical applicability of the software claimed as a process or method claim, is required to be defined in 
relation with the particular hardware components. Thus, the ‘software per se’ is differentiated from the software 
having its technical application in the industry. A claim directed to a technical process which process is carried out 
under the control of a program (whether by means of hardware or software), cannot be regarded as relating to a 
computer program as such. For example, “a method for processing seismic data, comprising the steps of collecting 
the time varying seismic detector output signals for a plurality of seismic sensors placed in a cable.” Here the 
signals are collected from a definite recited structure and hence allowable.”38  
In relation to the second category of apparatus claims, as long as it discloses a process limitation, that is it is 
of specific application, it would be patentable. It is interesting to note here that the manual states that “[a]s a 
general rule, a novel solution to a problem relating to the internal operations of a computer, although comprising a 
program or subroutine, will necessarily involve technological features of the computer hardware or the manner in 
which it operates and hence may be patentable.” This seems completely contrary to the legislative intention. The 
words per se must refer to the computer program in conjunction with something, as opposed to a mere computer 
program. A computer program having technical application is still a computer program per se. This sort of an 
interpretation could lead to absurd consequences. A computer program used for a non-technical process (having a 
non-technical application), but a process nonetheless, causing transformation in matter (for instance, as in Diehr, a 
process for curing rubber), would not be patentable. There is also no jurisprudential backing for such an 
interpretation. There is no basis for the patentability of a computer program with technical application as opposed 
to patentability of computer programs per se. Through this manual, the patent office seems to be attempting to 
circumvent clear legislative intention. 
However, the definition of computer program has been taken to include all forms of software without any 
distinction whatsoever. The manual states –  
“Computer programs are a set of instructions for controlling a sequence of operations of a data processing 
system. It closely resembles a mathematical method. It may be expressed in various forms e.g., a series of verbal 
statements, a flowchart, an algorithm, or other coded form and maybe presented in a form suitable for direct entry 
into a particular computer, or may require transcription into a different format (computer language). It may merely 
be written on paper or recorded on some machine readable medium such as magnetic tape or disc or optically 
scanned record, or it maybe permanently recorded in a control store forming part of a computer.”39  
This is perhaps one of the merits of the manual. The manual is also clear that algorithms (and mathematical 
methods) and computer programs that are simply expressed on a computer readable storage medium are not 
patentable.  
Perhaps if one studies the words of the Section itself, some light can be shone on the legislative intent. A 
study of the provision will be undertaken in the next section as this paper seeks to compare the Indian and US 
position on software patents.  
4. Comparison between Indian and US position 
 
The Act puts a specific bar on the patentability of a mathematical method and of algorithms. It is clear therefore 
that a computer program as used in the Act has a distinct meaning from an algorithm or mathematical method. 
This seems to imply that any computer program per se would not be patentable as under the Act. As far as the 
mathematical method or algorithms go, this seems to be consistent with Benson. As held in Benson and Flook, a 
patent that pre-empts the use of an algorithm is not permitted. Clearly, this is covered in the Indian scenario. The 
more tenuous part relates to the interpretation of per se as it appears in the Section. If one were to apply the 
interpretation as in the manual, notwithstanding that it may be in contravention with the express words of the 
Section, the technical application test seems to be akin to the position of law after State Street and A.T. & T. All 
software that has technical application would certainly have a useful, concrete and tangible result. However, since 
the technical application test seems to be completely against the statute, the correct interpretation would lead us to 
a situation that is akin almost entirely, to Bilski. While software per se may not be patentable, software that is tied 
to a machine or that causes a physical transformation would not be software per se and hence, would not be hit by 
the bar under Section 3(k). The position in Bilski is the correct test that needs to be applied even in the Indian 
scenario. However, such an interpretation stifles the patentability of software. Perhaps this explains why the patent 
manual has sought to step away from this approach. Much like the CCPA and CAFC did in respect to the 
SCOTUS judgements that tied them down, similarly the manual could as well prove to be an attempt to shift the 
line of thinking to be something that is more pro software patent. 
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Journal of International Commercial Law and Technology   Vol. 5, Issue 2 (2010)  
98 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
Bilski will soon be heard by SCOTUS and the law in relation to software as well as business method patents will 
hopefully be settled. The problem however, as seen in the past is that the CAFC will endeavour to distinguish or 
otherwise circumvent any anti patent ruling of SCOTUS. Given however, that Bilski seems to be walking the 
middle path, it might be in the interest SCOTUS to uphold it. Considering SCOTUS lately seems to be harbouring 
certain anti-patent sentiments,40 it may not be surprising if they hold that Bilski has been decided correctly in that 
the only way for software to be patent eligible is to satisfy the test, that is, it is both a necessary and a sufficient 
condition. Perhaps what SOCTUS can do is to unequivocally extend the same to pseudo process claims as well. 
An extreme interpretation would be that the tests would apply across the board to all such forms of patent 
applications, regardless of form. For instance, the CAFC in the A.T. & T. case stated that the scope of § 101 would 
be “the same regardless of the form--machine or process--in which a particular claim is drafted”. 
Perhaps the main problem with the law in the United States in relation to software patents is that the law is 
very old (drafted prior to the growth of the software industry and not amended since) and hence, the words are 
subject to varied interpretations given the new set of circumstances. However, in India, it has been sought by 
legislative mandate to bar all business method patents and bar patents that relate to software per se. The words are 
clear and unambiguous. India’s software industry is still in its initial phase and therefore, there is perhaps a need 
for allowing the patentability of software. The debate for or against patent protection is beyond the scope of this 
paper. However, the grant of patent protection for software that is already mandated copyright protection under the 
TRIPs agreement41 could prove to be extremely problematic. Software is perhaps more apt to receive patent 
protection than to receive copyright protection. For a change to be achieved in the mandate under TRIPs, countries 
should show in practice that patent protection has been useful in protecting the rights of the creators of the 
software, thereby doing away with the need of copyright protection for the same. This cannot happen in India 
unless the Indian Parliament amends the law. The patent manual if challenged in Court as being ultra vires the Act 
is likely to be struck down. Under law, therefore, there seems almost certainly to be a proscription on software 
patents. It is now up to Parliament to look at the policy implications of this and make changes if necessary.  
 
References  
 
1) Armon, O and E. Gardner (2009) “New Restrictions on the Patentability of Process Claims: Looking Beyond In Re 
Bilski”, Journal of Internet Law. 
2) Carvalho, N.P.  (2002)  The TRIPS Regime of Patent Rights .London: Kluwer Law International. 
3) Edwards, M.J. and D. Steinberg (2009) “The Implications of Bilski: Patentable Subject Matter in the United 
States”, 49 IDEA 411 (2009).  
4) Fusco, Stefania (2009) “Is in Re Bilski a Déjà vu?” Stanford Technology Law Review (2009).  
5) He, L. (2008) “In Re Bilski En Banc Hearing on patentable subject matter: Farewell to Business Method Patents?” 
Boston University Journal of Science and Technology Law, 252 (2008). 
6) Hulse, R.A. (2009) and R.R. Sachs, “Making Sense of the Revived Machine-or-Transformation Test in Re Bilski”, 
Intellectual Property & Technology Law Journal (2009).  
7) McEniery, B.J. (2009) “The Federal Circuit in Bilski: The Machine or Transformation Test”, 91 J. Pat. & 
Trademark Off. Soc'y 253  
8) Obhan, Essenese “Patenting of Software Inventions in India”, Spicy IP India.  
9) Shimokaji , M.A. and P.L. Gahagan (2009) “Mind Over Matter: The Bilski Decision, Like Others before It, 
Reveals How Courts Have Frequently Kept Patent Law Lagging behind Technology”, Los Angeles Lawyer, 36 
(2009).  
10) Stobbs, G.A. (2000) Software Patents. New York: Aspen Law & Business, 2nd Edition 
 
                                                          
40
 See L. He, “In Re Bilski En Banc Hearing on patentable subject matter: Farewell to Business Method Patents?”, Boston University 
Journal of Science and Technology Law, 252 (2008). 
41
 See Article 10.1 of the TRIPs Agreement read with Article 9.2. In his book, the TRIPs regime of patent rights, Carvalho argues that 
patent protection is more apt for software as opposed to copyright. However, this comparison is beyond the scope of this paper. See 
N.P. Carvalho, The TRIPS Regime of Patent Rights, 148-149, (London: Kluwer Law International, 2002). 
